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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Disclaimers of Permanent
Hair Removal. In addition to the
Commission's order requiring scientific support of permanency
claims, the court also reviewed the
Commission's requirement that
Removatron include a disclaimer
whenever its advertisements
claimed that its machines removed
hair, and send a copy of the order
to prior purchasers. Removatron
contended that this requirement
was "corrective" -

an advertising

requirement that commanded disclosure regardless of the future
advertisement's content. The court
explained that directing Removatron to send a copy of the order to
all past purchasers was not a corrective advertisement requirement; rather, this requirement
would guarantee full compliance
with the Commission's order.
Moreover, requiring the disclaimer
in future advertisements was not
corrective but was an affirmative
advertising requirement that demanded disclosure only when certain claims were made. The order
was not corrective because the
Commission only required Removatron to include the disclaimer
when the company claimed that its
machine removed hair.
Sufficient Evidence. Removatron also challenged whether sufficient evidence supported the Commission's findings. Removatron
first attacked the finding that it
had deceived the public by conveying the message that scientific tests
supported its permanency claims.
The company attempted to defend
its advertisements by advancing
several arguments. Removatron
contended that the company never
claimed that its machine was 100%
effective in permanently removing
hair for all people all the time. The
court found it irrelevant that Removatron did not explicitly make
this claim. The overwhelming message of the advertisement that the
machine would remove hair permanently for most people most of
the time was sufficient to support
the Commission's findings.
Additionally, Removatron
contended that the company qualified its advertisements by stating
that the machine would not work
on everyone and that one could
only attain permanent hair removVolume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990

al after several treatments. Again,
the court disagreed with Removatron and held that these qualifications were inadequate and ineffective because they failed to dispel
the message of the permanency
claim. Furthermore, Removatron
argued that the only relevant audience was the beauty industry. The
court found that the relevant audience, in addition to the beauty
industry, included potential purchasers and customers of purchasers. Purchasers and customers
were the relevant audience because
Removatron's sales personnel gave
brochures and other information
to the purchasers, who passed the
information on to potential clients.
Therefore, Removatron's advertisements reached an audience outside of the beauty industry.
Removatron also argued that
"clinically tested" did not mean
"supported by rigorous scientific
tests." The company claimed that a
lay person could determine that
"clinically tested" simply meant
that the product had been successful in a clinical setting, not that
well-controlled scientific tests had
been performed. The court rejected this argument and held that
Removatron failed to offer any
proof that the lay person would be
able to make this distinction.
At the same time that Removatron petitioned for review of the
Commission's order, the government sought an injunction pendente lite. An injunction pendente
lite forbids an act and takes affect
during the actual progress of a suit.
The government sought this injunction because Removatron continued to make its deceptive claims
during the course of the lawsuit.
Since the Commission's order
would not otherwise be binding on
Removatron if Removatron appealed the case to the United States
Supreme Court, the court granted
the injunction. The court concluded that the injunction was necessary to prevent future economic
harm to potential purchasers who
would be exposed to the deceptive
advertisements.
Cathleen R. Martwick

NEW YORK LEMON
LAW'S MINIMUM NEW
VEHICLE WARRANTY
PROTECTION DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
New York's "Lemon Law",
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 198-a, provided a minimum warranty of two
years or 18,000 miles for each new
car purchased and registered in the
State of New York. An organization representing the domestic and
foreign car industry challenged the
statute, charging that it impermissibly interfered with interstate
commerce. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Association of United
States v. Abrams, 720 F. Supp. 284
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), the United States
District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that
section 198-a(b) of the Lemon Law
did not per se violate the commerce clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, §
8, cl. 3, by regulating manufacturers, agents and dealers who did
business outside of New York.
However, the court struck down
the portion of the statute requiring
out-of-state dealers and agents to
send written notice of owner complaints to the manufacturers. The
court upheld the remainder of the
statute because its benefits clearly
exceeded the burdens it imposed
on interstate commerce.
Background
The Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Association of the United
States ("the Association") included trade associations that represented the interests of domestic
and foreign car manufacturers, importers, and distributors. The Association claimed that section
198-a(b), which in effect established a minimum level of new
vehicle warranty protection, violated the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. According to the Association, section
198-a(b) was per se invalid under
the commerce clause because it
regulated interstate commerce, it
"opened the door" to inconsistent
state regulation of an area requiring uniformity, and it impermissi(continued on page 84)
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New York Lemon Law (continued from page 83)
bly disadvantaged consumers in
other states. In the alternative, the
Association argued that the statute's burden on interstate commerce greatly exceeded any benefit
to the State of New York.
Commerce Clause Analysis
The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have
Power... To regulate Commerce
... among the several States." U.S.

Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The court
noted that while this grant of congressional power implicitly limits
the power of states to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce,
the states possess a residuum of
power to enact legislation of local
concern that to some degree affects
or regulates interstate commerce.
In analyzing whether section
198-a(b) unduly interfered with
interstate commerce, the court applied the two-pronged test set forth
by the United States Supreme
Court in Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
First, if a statute directly regulates
interstate commerce, or if it effectively favors in-state interests over
out-of-state interests, then the statute is invalid without further inquiry. A statute survives the per se
test if it evenhandedly regulates or
only indirectly affects interstate
commerce. The court must then
apply the balancing test to determine if the State's interests are
legitimate, and if so, whether the
State's interests clearly exceed the
burden on interstate commerce.
No Per Se Violation
In addressing whether section
198-a(b) per se violated the commerce clause, the court first looked
to the specific requirements of the
statute. The statute provided that
if a new car did not conform to all
express warranties during the two
years after delivery or first eighteen
thousand miles, the consumer
could report the defect to the car
agent, dealer or manufacturer.
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 198-a(b). If
the dealer or agent received a notice of defect, the dealer or agent
84

had to forward the notice to the
manufacturer, and the manufacturer had to correct the defect at no
charge to the consumer. N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law § 198-a(b).
The Association argued that
the statute directly regulated outof-state conduct because the "notice and repair" requirement was
not limited to New York dealers.
The court held that the Association
misconstrued the statute to require
out-of-state dealers to repair the
cars. Rather, the statute imposed
the repair obligation on the manufacturer, its agent or dealer, but the
manufacturer decided how to repair the vehicles that developed
problems while outside New York.
The court described how various car companies conformed to
the statute. For instance, Ford Motor Company instituted a program
under which New York owners
would pay the cost of repairs to the
out-of-state dealer and then be
reimbursed by a New York dealer.
General Motors instituted a program under which the New York
owner would pay the cost of the
deductible to the out-of-state dealer and then be reimbursed by a
New York dealer. Both programs
imposed no free repair obligation
on the out-ofstate dealer, and the
State of New York apparently considered both programs to be in
compliance with the statute.
The court stated, however,
that the statute directly regulated
out-of-state dealers by requiring
them to forward notice of any
defects to the manufacturer. The
court held that this obligation, as
harmless as it was, still regulated
interstate commerce. Furthermore, the fact that New York
courts lacked jurisdiction to enforce the notice obligation against
an out-of-state agent or dealer reinforced the conclusion that the notice provision affected interstate
commerce. That the agents and
dealers had otherwise contracted
with the manufacturers to service
vehicles according to the manufacturers' warranty policies was irrelevant because the notice obligation
was imposed by the statute, not by
contract. Accordingly, the court

held that the statute violated the
commerce clause insofar as it obligated out-of-state agents and dealers to send to manufacturers notice
of owner complaints.
The Association next argued
that the statute per se violated the
commerce clause because the cost
of the statute's warranty provision
would increase automobile prices
charged outside of New York. The
court held that the record did not
support this argument. The court
distinguished section 198-a(b)
from previous statutes invalidated
by the United States Supreme
Court in Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986),
and Healy v. Beer Institute, - U.S.
-,

109 S.Ct. 2491 (1989). For

instance, the liquor price control
statutes in Brown-Forman and
Healy tied the prices that distributors could charge in-state to those
charged in other states. The distributors could not change the prices charged outside the state without violating the statute.
The court stated that here
neither the warranty provision nor
the notice provision raised the concern expressed in the liquor price
control cases. There was no reason
to believe that the manufacturers
who had to comply with section
198-a(b) would "not do what logic
dictates and . . . pass along the

added costs to the consumers who
benefit from the statute, namely
those who purchase and register
their cars in New York." 720 F.
Supp. at 289. Consequently, unlike
the liquor price control statutes,
section 198-a(b) did not set automobile prices charged outside of
New York.
Statute's Benefits Do Not
Exceed Its Burden
Because the repair obligation
of section 198-a(b) did not per se
violate the commerce clause, the
court considered whether the
State's interests exceeded the burden imposed on interstate commerce. In weighing the State's interest, the court considered the
New York Attorney General's inVolume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990
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vestigations of serious defects in
various makes and models of new
cars, which often were not discovered during the standard one
year/12,000 mile warranty. In light
of this, the court stated that the
New York State legislature had
enacted section 198-a(b) to redress
the significant problem with the
automotive industry's warranty
practices.
The court disagreed with the
Association's contention that the
costs of complying with the law
impacted adversely on interstate
commerce. First, most automobile
manufacturers were not affected
by the statute because they offered
warranties in excess of the statutory requirements. Second, many of
those affected by the statute had
simply passed along the costs of
compliance to purchasers. For instance, Ford Motors charged New
York consumers an extra $115.00
for "Mandatory New York Repair
Coverage" on a new car. Finally,
manufacturers had shown an ability to adapt to other state regulations having a much greater impact
on the distribution and manufacture of cars than did section 198a(b). Automobile manufacturers
had made such adjustments as reprogramming computers, changing
advertising, tracing the ownership
of vehicles and even offering distinct warranties. The record
showed that manufacturers were
able to make these adjustments
with minimal disruption to the
nationwide automobile distribution.
The Association further argued that it was impossible for
manufacturers to put state-specific
warranty information in vehicles
prior to shipment to dealers. However, the court held that this claim
was frivolous. Ford Motor Company currently disclosed the contents
of section 198-a(b) to New York
purchasers. Furthermore, as the
record showed, manufacturers had
little difficulty in disclosing other
state-specific substantive information. Moreover, the court noted,
section 198-a(b) did not require
manufacturers to disclose anything. The court noted that even if
the statute required disclosure,
such disclosure would be feasible.
By analogy, the credit card indusVolume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990

try disclosed the interest rates
charged in all fifty states. Regardless, the court stated that disclosure is a "tolerable by-product" of
doing business on the national level.
The Association finally argued that section 198-a(b) advantaged in-state business over out-ofstate business. The court held that
the statute did not advantage some
manufacturers at the expense of
others because the statute applied
to all manufacturers equally. Accordingly, the court held that the
benefits of section 198-a(b) exceeded the burdens it imposed on interstate commerce. Because the burden was minimal and did not
discriminate against out-of-state
businesses, the court upheld the
section 198-a(b) repair provision.
Marianne L. Simonini

LANDOWNERS ARE
NOT REQUIRED TO
EXERCISE GREATER
CARE TOWARD
LICENSEES THAN
INVITEES
In Gallegos v. Phipps, 779
P.2d 856 (Colo. 1989), the Colorado Supreme Court examined a
Colorado landowner's duty to protect an invitee injured upon his
land under a recently enacted landowner liability statute. 6A Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 13-21-115 (1987). The
court determined that the statute
violated both the federal and state
constitutional guarantee of equal
protection by imposing on landowners a higher standard of care
for licensees than for invitees.
Background
On December 28, 1986, appellant, Bernie L. Gallegos ("Gallegos") patronized The Ram, a restaurant and bar located in
Georgetown, Colorado. Gallegos
became visibly intoxicated during
his visit there, and upon leaving
The Ram, fell down a flight of
stairs and was seriously injured.
Gallegos brought suit against The
Ram's management (Red Ram

Management) and the owners of
the premises (Red Ram Venture)
(all co-defendants are hereinafter
referred to collectively as "Red
Ram").
At the jury trial, Gallegos argued that Red Ram violated section 13-21-115 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes, Colo. Rev. Stat. §
13-21-115 (1987), by serving Gallegos too much alcohol and then
deliberately failing to exercise reasonable care to protect him against
a known danger: the stairwell. Gallegos contended that the stairwell
created a danger not ordinarily
present on property of that type.
Gallegos also argued, in the alternative, that section 13-21-115 denied him equal protection of the
laws because it required landowners to warn licensees, but not invitees, of dangers on their property.
Red Ram offered evidence
that not only were the stairs typical
of those found in similar Georgetown buildings, but that the stairs
were safely constructed and maintained. Red Ram further contended that Gallegos fell down the
stairs while in a self-induced
"drunken stupor'."
The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Red Ram, specifically
finding that Gallegos' injuries were
not caused by any dangerous condition at The Ram, that Red Ram
did not deliberately fail to exercise
reasonable care, and that Gallegos
was injured by his own negligence.
The Colorado Supreme
Court's Decision
Gallegos appealed directly to
the Supreme Court of Colorado,
asserting, among other things, that
section 13-21-115 unconstitutionally violated his rights to equal
protection under the laws. Specifically, he argued that the statutory
scheme was arbitrary, unreasonable, and bore no rational relationship to a legitimate state objective
because it provided less protection
to invitees than to licensees. The
statute caused similarly situated
parties (tort victims) to be treated
dissimilarly because tort vitims of
landowners must prove that the
landowner acted deliberately,
while victims of other types of
tortfeasors need only prove negli(continued on page 86)
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